Abstract: Drawing on the distinction between envy and signaling effects in income comparison, this paper uses 307,465 observations for subjective well-being and its covariates from Germany, 1990Germany, -2009, to study whether the nature of income comparison has changed in the process of economic development, and how such changes are related to changes in the nature of income formation. By conceptualizing a person's comparison income as the income predicted by an earnings equation, we find that, while in 1990-1999 envy has been the dominant concern in West Germany and signaling the dominant factor in East Germany, income comparison was non-existing in 2000-2009. We also find that the earnings equation reflects people's ability more accurately in the second than in the first period. Together, these findings suggest that comparing one's income with people of the same ability is important only when ability is insufficiently reflected in own income.
Introduction
The subjective evaluation of income has been an important issue in economic analysis in recent years. An intriguing result of the pertinent literature is that individuals typically evaluate their own income in comparison with some comparison income, that is, the typical income of people with whom they share some relevant characteristics (see Clark et al. 2008 for a survey).
As suggested by Hirschman (1973) , comparison income may affect a person in two different ways. One mechanism builds upon the "relative income" and "conspicuous consumption" hypotheses known in the literature for more than a century (Duesenberry 1949 , Veblen 1899 see Clark et al. 2008 for a survey). In this perspective, a higher level of comparison income triggers a feeling of envy and thus has a negative effect on a person's utility. The second mechanism involves the idea of signaling. In this view, a higher level of comparison income serves as an indicator for the income level a person may attain in the future, thus affecting her utility positively.
Building on this distinction, Hirschman (1973) conjectured that the signaling value of comparison income may be dominant in early stages of economic development that are characterized by a high degree of social and economic uncertainty. Consistent with the idea of signaling when economic prospects are uncertain, Senik (2004 Senik ( , 2008 found a positive relationship between utility, measured by subjective well-being, and a measure of people's comparison income in Russia and in several other transition economies of Eastern Europe in the 1990s, whereas the relationship tended to be negative in West European countries.
This paper addresses the roles of envy and signaling in a more long-term perspective, aiming to identify whether the nature of income comparison changes when social and economic circumstances change. Following previous literature, we use data on subjective well-being (SWB) as an empirical proxy for utility (see Frey and Stutzer 2002 , DiTella and MacCulloch 2006 , Kahneman and Krueger 2006 for surveys) and investigate how SWB is related to the survey respondents' own income and a measure of comparison income. Our analysis refers to Germany, 1990-2009, and involves 307,465 observations, of which 74,254 come from East Germany and 233,209 come from West Germany. Our measure of comparison income is income "predicted" by an earnings equation on the basis of a person's productivity-relevant characteristics (age, sex, level of education). To account for changes in the economic and institutional environment, we differentiate our analysis with respect to East and West Germany and with respect to two periods, 1990-1999 and 2000-2009. The differentiation between East and West Germany and the time frame considered, including 20 years after unification, allows us to study explicitly if and how the relationship between well-being and comparison income differs between East and West and by the stage in the development process. With regard to the latter, it can be argued that economic instability and uncertainty were high in East Germany in the early years after unification. A person from East Germany may thus have perceived a high income level of people with similar characteristics as an indicator of her own future prospects, but this signaling value may have declined over time as economic conditions became more stable and predictable. In West Germany, conversely, being more economically stable and advanced, it is likely that envy rather than signaling has been the dominant factor in income comparison.
Consistent with this reasoning we find that in the period 1990-1999 the well-being of East Germans was significantly positively related to the income of people with similar characteristics (dominance of signaling effect), whereas the well-being of West Germans was significantly negatively related to the income of similar people (dominance of envy effect). In the period 2000-2009, all of these relationships became insignificant.
The finding that income comparisons with similarly productive people became insignificant in the second period is consistent with the circumstance that the earnings equation, from which comparison income is derived, is more accurate in the second than in the first period. More specifically, the explanatory power (coefficient of determination) of age, sex and the level of education as predictors of income is much greater in the second period than it is in the first. This indicates (i) that in the second period income reflects people's ability more accurately and (ii) that income uncertainty has decreased. As a consequence of (i), a source of envy -income differences that are not justified by differences in ability -has decreased. As a consequence of (ii), the need for an indicator of one's own future income prospects has decreased. Thus, changes in income formation seem to have weakened both factors which drive income comparison with "people like me", rendering the coefficient of comparison income insignificant.
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Previous studies on income comparison with "similar" others include Clark and Oswald (1996) , Senik (2004 , 2008 ), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005 , Caporale et al. (2009) and Knies (2012) . These papers differ with respect to the way comparison income is measured.
While Clark and Oswald (1996) and Senik (2004 Senik ( , 2008 indirectly, based on cross-sectional inference (as do previous studies), but directly, based on inter-temporal evidence. In addition, they suggest that the importance of comparison income for individual well-being varies with the degree to which income reflects ability rather than mere chance.
We follow previous literature by investigating how the level of a pre-defined concept of comparison income affects subjective well-being, rather than the income of a reference group people say they compare themselves to (as do Clark and Senik 2010). 2 One benefit from doing so is that the proxy for comparison income that we use is explicitly connected to ability; this way we are able to study how the strength of this connection may influence the relationship between comparison income and well-being.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodological framework and section 3 reports and discusses the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
Methodological Framework

Conceptual Background
Following Hirschman (1973) it is assumed that an individual derives utility u from her current income y and her expected future income y e . In addition, she receives disutility from some comparison income, that is, the "typical" income ŷ of persons with similar characteristics as herself:
2 Clark and Senik (2010) find that colleagues are the most frequently-cited reference group and argue that this is consistent with information effects, as colleagues' income contains more information about the individual's own future prospects than do the incomes of other reference groups.
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Expected income is assumed to be an increasing function of comparison income:
Hence we get
and the marginal utility from comparison income is
In this equation, the first term on the right hand side is the information or signaling effect, which says that in circumstances of social and economic uncertainty an individual takes a change in the income of people with similar characteristics as a signal that her own income is going to change in the same way (Hirschman 1973) . It is natural to think that the characteristics relevant for signaling to be effective are those that refer to the person's productivity or ability.
The second term in the above equation refers to the conventional envy phenomenon known in the context of the "conspicuous consumption" and "relative income" hypotheses.
Since the signaling channel involves a positive and the envy channel a negative partial relationship between comparison income and utility, the sign of the overall relationship is ambiguous. As argued by Hirschman (1973) , the signaling effect is more likely to dominate the envy effect in early stages of development, when economic conditions are volatile and uncertain, than when they are stable.
As already mentioned, for signaling to be effective comparison income should be understood as the "typical" income of people with similar ability as the person considered.
We will implement this idea by modeling comparison income as the income "predicted" by a set of ability-relevant characteristics z:
ŷ , will therefore be determined from an earnings regression of the form (as in Clark and Oswald 1996 and Senik 2004 , 2008 :
According to this formulation, a person's income is composed of a systematic part i ŷ (which reflects her ability) and a random part i ε ,
The coefficient of determination of the above regression,
measures the proportion in which observed income is explained by ability-relevant characteristics. This proportion can be interpreted in two ways. In the first place, R 2 is the extent to which income reflects ability, an interpretation to which we shall refer in discussing our results concerning envy. In a somewhat different perspective, R 2 provides us with a measure of income uncertainty (randomness), namely the proportion of income variance unexplained (by ability),
. From the point of view of signaling, differences in R 2 across regions or over time may therefore correspond to differences in the usefulness of comparison income so determined as a signal of one's future prospects: As R 2 increases, it becomes less necessary to have an indicator that signals one's income prospects.
Overall, differences in the coefficient of determination of the earnings regression across different cross sections or across time can be interpreted as differences in the certainty of income or in the congruence of income with ability.
Data
Our data comes from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which is a representative longitudinal panel data set of the population in Germany (see Wagner et al. 2007 ). The SOEP data are based on surveys in which adult persons (aged 15 and over) are Following Clark and Oswald (1996) , among others, we use as comparison income the income "predicted" by an earnings equation on the basis of a person's productivity-relevant characteristics (ability). We use a parsimonious specification which includes only those characteristics of reference persons that are likely to be observed by the person considered.
Those characteristics are age, sex, and the level of education (see also Senik 2004 Senik , 2008 ).
With respect to the level of education, Germany (unlike most other countries) has a streamed system of secondary schooling with the corresponding certificates representing different levels of qualification. The certificates are, in increasing order of qualification:
Hauptschule leaving certificate; Realschule leaving certificate; technical college entrance qualification (Fachhochschulreife); university entrance qualification (Allgemeine Hochschulreife). In the earnings equation we will use dummy variables for these types of certificates rather than the number of years of schooling because the latter inadequately reflect education-related ability in the German schooling system. 
Econometric Approach
The earnings equation takes the general form of equation (4) OLS and ordered-probit or ordered-logit models. We therefore estimate equation (6) using least squares. To account for the fact that comparison income is obtained from a first-stage regression, we report bootstrapped standard errors, based on 1,000 replications. In all the regionally and temporally defined (sub)samples we obtain the expected qualitative results: Earnings are increasing in age and decreasing in age-squared, they are lower for women than for men, and there are premia for better education, the respective coefficients all being significant at conventional levels. There are, however, considerable differences between East and West and across time:
Results and Discussion
The Earnings Equation
(1) For both time periods, the constant term is greater in the East than in the West, whereas the earnings differences between women and men and the education premium 4 More detailed results concerning the controls are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix.
The Life Satisfaction Equation
These results do not qualitatively differ between East and West and with respect to time. As is significant, whereas the coefficient for comparison income is negative and significant (at the 5 percent level). The same qualitative results are obtained for West Germany when comparison income is the predicted income for overall Germany (regression B) and when comparison income is specified either as the predicted West German income (regression C) or the predicted East German income (regression D). In all these cases, the coefficients on comparison income are negative and significant.
Results are different for East Germany. When own income and the comparison income for Germany overall are included (regression E), both have a positive and significant coefficient. This result does not change, when comparison income is specified either as the predicted West German income (regression F) or the predicted East German income (regression G). In all these cases, the coefficients on comparison income are positive and significant, even though the coefficients on comparison income and on West German comparison income are significant at the 10 percent level only.
In terms of the envy-signaling framework, our results thus suggest that in West
Germany the dominant effect of comparison income in the 1990s was via the envy channel, whereas in East Germany the signaling effect of comparison income was dominant. 5 These results are consistent with earlier findings for the 1990s, namely that the envy effect tended to dominate the signaling effect in Western Europe, whereas the signaling effect was dominant in the transition economies of Eastern Europe and in Russia (Senik 2004 (Senik , 2008 Caporale et al. 2009 ).
common in data sets for developed countries (see Dolan et al. 2008) , life satisfaction is ushaped in age, highest for married and lowest for separated persons, lowest if being unemployed than in any other employment status, and increasing in income.
5 The dominance of the envy effect in Germany overall reflects the greater number of observations from West Germany compared to East Germany (75,285 versus 27,451). German comparison income in East Germany, regression G in Table 3 ). However, all coefficients of comparison income are entirely insignificant. 
Discussion
We got the intriguing result that, while being predominantly a source of envy in the West and a benchmark for forming income expectations in the East in the 1990s, both of these effects seem to have vanished in the course of time. 7 One explanation for this result may 6 In addition to the qualitative relationships (signs and significance), one might be tempted to interpret the magnitudes of coefficients. In this regard, however, it is important to note that own income and the various versions of comparison income occupy considerably different ranges. As seen in Table A1 , the log of own income is in the range -0.068 to 11.226, with standard deviation 0.481, whereas the range of log comparison income was much more 
Conclusions
Drawing on the distinction between envy and signaling effects in income comparison, this paper has used 307,465 observations for subjective well-being and its covariates from Germany, 1990 Germany, -2009 The distinction between envy and signaling effects goes back to Hirschman (1973) , who conjectured that the roles of these two effects may change in the process of economic development. Unified Germany offers a unique field to study Hirschman's conjecture because the Eastern and the Western part of the country were at different stages of development for a considerable time after unification, East Germany being characterized by considerable economic volatility and uncertainty in the 1990s. These differences in economic uncertainty suggest that the signaling effect may have dominated the envy effect in East Germany, whereas the opposite applies to West Germany.
Our results from subjective well-being regressions for the period 1990-1999 are consistent with these expectations. In addition, considering that economic uncertainty in East While there has been some previous literature on envy vs. signaling in Western and Eastern Europe, those studies focused on the immediate post-transition period of the 1990s. In contrast to those studies, the present paper addresses the envy-versus-signaling issue in a more long-term perspective. Our results for the 1990s are consistent with previous findings, but, in addition, we are able to show that there is some dynamics in the nature of income comparison. Given our findings regarding income formation, we conjecture that those changes in income comparison are related to changes in income uncertainty over time. This is the benefit from modeling comparison income as predicted income rather than as a cell-mean.
Overall, this study has highlighted the importance of income formation for the existence and sign of the income comparison effect. Future research may address the transferability of our results to other countries. Note: *** , ** , and * denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively; bootstrapped standard errors with 1,000 iterations; income variables in logarithms. Problems: Economic Impacts of Productivity, Sensitivity, and Adaptive Capacity
